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When Seeking Reinstatement of Workers'
Compensation Benefits After Layoff from Modified
Duty Work, A Claimant Must Prove that the Original
Disability Has Continued and is Once Again Causing
Decreased Earning Power
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Laubach)
WORKERS'

COMPENSATION -

REINSTATEMENT

OF DISABILrTY BENEFITS

AFrER LAYOFF FROM MODIFIED DUTY WORK -

CLAIMANT'S BURDEN OF

PROOF -

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an injured
worker seeking reinstatement of benefits, after being laid off from
modified duty work, need only demonstrate that the disability from
his original work injury has continued and that it is once again
causing him to suffer decreased earning power through no fault of
his own.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. W.C.A.B. (Laubach), 760 A.2d 378
(Pa.2000).
On December 10, 1995, Bethlehem Steel Corporation laid off
steelworker George Laubach, who was laboring in a modified duty
position as a result of a compensable work-related injury sustained
to his low back in 1992.1 Although Laubach's doctors never
released him to return to full duty work at his pre-injury position,
he was cleared for, and did return to, light duty work with
Bethlehem Steel on January 28, 1993.2 He remained employed in
this light duty position until the layoff, which occurred in the wake
of the plant's closure by Bethlehem Steel.3 In the aftermath of the
layoff, Bethlehem Steel declined to voluntarily reinstate total
1. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Laubach), 760 A-2d 378, 379-80 (Pa. 2000).
George Laubach's low back strain occurred on September 7, 1992, and Bethlehem Steel
accepted the claim via issuance of a notice of compensation payable and payment of total
disability benefits. Id. at 379.
2. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A-2d at 379-80. Laubach had varying periods of partial disability
benefits when his actual earnings fell below his pre-injury average weekly wage, alternating
with suspension of benefits when his actual earnings exceeded his pre-injury average weekly
wage. Id.
3. Id. at 380. Although Bethlehem Steel did not close all of its sites, employment at an
alternate location was never offered to Laubach. Id.
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disability benefits to Laubach. 4 However, they did continue to make
5
payment of partial disability benefits.
In response to Bethlehem Steel's refusal to reinstate total
disability benefits, Laubach filed a penalty petition on January 15,
1996.6 Bethlehem Steel then proceeded to file a petition for
modification/suspension of benefits based on Laubach's return to
modified duty with fluctuating partial disability rates between June
25, 1995 and December 31, 1995.7
Laubach prevailed at the workers' compensation judge level
("WCJ"). The "WCJ" handled Laubach's penalty petition as a
reinstatement petition and awarded him total disability benefits.8 In
granting the reinstatement of total disability benefits, the WCJ
determined that Laubach had met the requisite burden of proof by
showing that, at the time of his layoff, he was still working in a
modified duty position, had never recovered sufficiently to return
to his pre-injury position, and was laid off by the employer for
economic reasons. 9 The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
10
affirmed the WCJ's decision.
On appeal to the commonwealth court, Bethlehem Steel argued
that the WCJ erroneously awarded the reinstatement of total
disability benefits since there was no proof that Laubach's earning
capacity had actually changed or decreased and Bethlehem had laid
him off for economic purposes.1 However, the commonwealth
court concurred with both the Board and the WCJ in affirming the
2
prior decisions.'
The commonwealth court explained the rule for situations where
an employee has returned to work in a light duty capacity but still
has work restrictions even though his disability payments are
4. Id. Total disability is "[a] worker's inability to substantially perform employment
related duties because of physical condition." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 191 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
5. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A2d at 380. Partial disability is "[a] worker's inability to
perform duties that he or she accomplished before an accident, even though the worker can
engage in some gainful activity on the job." BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 191 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
6. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 380.
7. Id.
8. Id. The WCJ did allow Bethlehem Steel's modification/suspension petition with
respect to the six months prior to the layoff. Id.
9. Id.
10.

Id.

11. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 380. Earning capacity is defined as "[olne's ability or
power to earn money given one's physical or mental capabilities. -Also termed earning
power." BACK'S LAW DITIONARY 214 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
12. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A2d at 380.
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suspended.13 In that factual situation, if the employee is later laid
off, he then gets the benefit of an automatic presumption that any
disability (as shown by a reduction in his earning power) is still
directly related to his work injury. 14 To avoid this presumption, an
employer would have to do one of two things: (1) the employer
could produce evidence that modified duty work within appropriate
restrictions had been offered to the employee; or (2) the employer
could establish that the employee's disability or lost earnings were
no longer causally related to his original work injury. 15 As
Bethlehem Steel failed to demonstrate either point, the court found
that the WCJ had not erred in ordering the reinstatement of
16
Laubach's total disability.
Bethlehem Steel appealed the commonwealth court's decisions
and in doing so, conceded that the automatic presumption of
relatedness did arise when they laid Laubach off from his light duty
position, but argued that it did not operate to relieve the employee
of establishing a causal link between his loss of earning power and
his work injury.'7 It further asserted that the employer was entitled
to demonstrate that the employee's reduction in earnings was not
the result of a loss of actual earning power due to the work injury,
but that the decreased earnings arose for other reasons.' 8 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to review the case to examine
the burden of proof required of a claimant seeking reinstatement of
total disability benefits after being laid off from a modified duty
position by his time-of-injury employer. 9
In an opinion authored by Justice Stephen Zappala, the court
found that Laubach was entitled to reinstatement of his total
13. Id.
14. Id. "Disability under the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act is more than
'impairment', it is loss of earning power." DAVID B. TORREY & ANDREW E. GREENBERG,
PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION: LAw AND PRAcTnCE, § 5:3 at 5-12 (2000).
15. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 380. Lost earnings are defined as "[wiages or salary
that could have been earned if death or a disabling injury had not occurred." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 214 (Pocket Ed. 1996).
16. Bethlehem Steel, 760 k2d at 380. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
court found that Laubach had never been given a full duty release to his pre-injury position,
was working in a light duty capacity up to the time of the layoff, and therefore, received the
benefit of the presumption that his decreased earning power was still directly related to the
work injury. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Note the distinction that Bethlehem Steel is making between a loss of earning
power, or the ability to earn wages, and a mere reduction or decrease in earnings which may
be due to other factors. Id.
19. Id.
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disability benefits in these circumstances.20 The court rejected
Bethlehem Steel's contention that because Laubach's physical
ability to work light duty had not changed, his earning power had
not changed, and a layoff due to economic downturn did not entitle
him to reinstatement of his total disability benefits. 21 Justice
Zappala found that Section 413 of the Workers' Compensation Act
controlled, 22 and relied on Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments
Division23 to establish that the burden of proof differs for
claimants seeking reinstatement of benefits. 24 In Pieper, the court
articulated that the burden of proof turns on whether the benefit
status prior to seeking the reinstatement is one of termination or
suspension.2 5
Using Pieper as a guide, Zappala confirmed that following a
termination of benefits, a claimant seeking reinstatement has the
responsibility of proving that his current disability is still causally
related to the original work injury.26 In addition, under Pieper,the
terminated claimant will also have to prove that there has been a
change in his physical condition that has either caused his level of
disability to increase or brought about a recurrence of his
disability. 27

In contrast, Justice Zappala notes that for the claimant whose
benefits have been merely suspended, Pieper articulates a
two-prong test: (1) the claimant need only show that he is suffering
a continuing disability from his original work injury; and (2) has
20. Id. at 381.
21. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 380-81. Bethlehem Steel maintained that as Laubach's
reduction in earnings was solely due to the layoff, and not any change in his physical
condition, reinstatement of total disability was not warranted. Id. at 381.
22. 77 PS. § 772.
[T]hat where compensation has been suspended because the employe's earnings are
equal to or in excess of his wages prior to the injury that payments under the
agreement or award may be resumed at any time during the period for which
compensation for partial disability is payable, unless it be shown that the loss in
earnings does not result from the work injury.
Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 381.
23. Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Div., 584 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1990).
24. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A-2d at 381.
25. Id. Termination is when "all disability related to a compensable injury has ceased,"
and goes "hand in hand with a termination of the liability of the employer." Pieper, 584 A.2d
at 304. Suspension is when "the earning power of the claimant is no longer affected by his
disability, whether it arises from his employer offering a suitable replacement employment,
or from the ability of the claimant to secure other suitable employment that provides greater
or equal compensation." Id.
26. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 381.
27. Id.
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experienced a negative impact on his capacity to earn wages as a
result of the work related disability through no fault of his own.2 8
The rationale for this lower burden of proof is twofold. 29 First, in
Pieper, the court held that in a suspension scenario, the causal
connection between ongoing disability and original work injury is
presumed since the original injury was either accepted by the
0 Secondly,
employer or proven in the context of a claim petition.A
in a suspension scenario, full recovery does not terminate the
employer's ongoing responsibility, rather, the suspension is
indicative of the fact that though the disability has not ceased, the
claimant's wages have reached the point of being equal to or
31
greater than his pre-injury earnings.
Viewing the Bethlehem case in light of the principles articulated
in Pieper,Justice Zappala noted that the analysis used by the court
in Stevens v. W.C.A.B. (Consolidation Coal Company),3 2 issued just
two days earlier, was useful for this case as well.3 In Stevens, the
court had analyzed the same issue (claimant's burden of proof for
reinstatement) in the slightly different factual scenario where the
employee obtained employment within his physical restrictions
elsewhere, but was then terminated.3 4 Although the employer
argued that claimant's termination from the new job placed him in
the position of having to demonstrate a causal connection between
his loss of earnings and his work injury, the court disagreed and
held that the two prong test of Pieper sets the standard for
35
resolving this question.
In addition, the supreme court dismissed the argument that a
claimant fails the first prong of Pieper when he is fired from
alternate employment because his earnings are then arguably
lowered through his own fault.3 6 The court in Stevens looked to the
Pieper test and determined that the claimant satisfied both
28. Id. at 381-82.
29. Id. at 381.
30. Id.
31. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 381.
32. 760 A.2d 369 (Pa. 2000).
33. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 383.
34. Id. at 382. The claimant had suffered a back injury and had undergone surgery, but
as he was never released to his pre-injury position, he pursued additional education and
found employment as a private investigator from which he was subsequently fired and he
sought reinstatement. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. In Stevens, there was no finding by the WCJ that claimant had acted in bad
faith or deliberately caused himself to be fired. Id.
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branches.3 7 The fact that the claimant had never been deemed fully
recovered, could not return to his pre-injury position, and had
demonstrated that his earning power was again reduced through no
fault of his own led the court to this decision. 8 The Stevens court
went on to indicate that once a claimant satisfies the Pieper test,
the employer must demonstrate that employment has been offered
within his work restrictions or a reinstatement of total disability
39
benefits is warranted.
Applying this rationale to the case at hand, the court found that
Laubach fulfilled the Pieper test since he never made a full
recovery, was unable to perform his pre-injury duties, and the
layoff from the modified duty position was not attributable to any
fault on his part.40 As Bethlehem Steel made no showing that
employment was available within Laubach's restrictions, the court
41
held that Laubach was entitled to reinstatement of total disability.
Justice Nigro filed a concurring opinion, which indicated that the
case could be analyzed more appropriately under Kachinski v.
W.C.A.B. (Vepco Construction Co.), 42 which set forth a four prong
standard that an employer must meet upon returning an injured
employee to work." The first requirement is that the employer
must prove a change in claimant's medical condition when it
desires to modify his benefits on the theory that he has some work
abilities. 44 Second, the burden is on the employer to establish a
referral to an available job within the claimant's current
restrictions. 45 Third, the burden then shifts to the claimant to prove
46
that he has made a good faith effort to follow up on the referral.
Lastly, in the event the claimant does not obtain a job from the
47
referral, he continues to be eligible for benefits.
In applying these Kachinski criteria to the case at hand, Justice
Nigro noted that Bethlehem Steel failed to satisfy the second prong,
that the employer has the burden to establish that work is available
within claimant's restrictions, after they withdrew the modified
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 382-83.
Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 382-83.
Id. at 383.

40.

Id.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
532 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1987).
Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 383 (Nigro, J., concurring).
Id. (Nigro, J., concurring).
Id. (Nigro, J., concurring).
Id. (Nigro, J., concurring).
Id. (Nigro, J., concurring).
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duty position and laid Laubach off.48 Once Bethlehem Steel could
no longer demonstrate actual job availability within Laubach's
restrictions, because of the layoff, Laubach is then entitled to
reinstatement of his total disability benefits.4 9 Justice Nigro stated
that although the analysis used in the majority opinion is very
similar, and reaches the same result, as his Kachinski evaluation,
Kachinski is the better guideline for such problems given the
myriad of possible factual scenarios.5 0 Justice Saylor, with Justices
Cappy and Castille joining, concurred in the result and affirmed the
5
reasoning used in the Stevens decision. '
Workers' Compensation Judge David B. Torrey noted that while it
is true that the claimant will always bear the burden of proof in a
reinstatement
petition, his burden
hinges on disability
determination, which as Torrey has observed, "is governed purely
by decisional law" in Pennsylvania. 52 Over time, the case law has
inseparably intertwined this disability determination with the
concept of the availability of work doctrine.5 This is due in large
part to the fact that Pennsylvania is a "wage loss" state, which
means that an employee who sustains an injury at work is
considered totally disabled as long as he cannot return to his
pre-injury job. 4 The employee is entitled to total disability
payments during this period. 55 However, an employer can reduce its
liability by establishing that there is work available within the
injured worker's capabilities, and then the claimant is considered to
be "partially disabled." 56 If a partially disabled employee returns to
work, but has a loss of earning power, he is entitled to payment of
compensation benefits in the form of a differential.5 7 If, however,
the partially disabled employee returns to work with no loss of
48. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d at 383 (Nigro, J., concurring). Justice Nigro notes that
prior to the layoff, Bethlehem Steel had in fact satisfied prong one and prong two by offering
modified duty, and Laubach had satisfied prong three by working the modified duty job. Id.
49. Id. at 383-84 (Nigro, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 384 (Nigro, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Saylor, J., concurring).
52. TORREY & GREENBERG, supra note 14, §11:114 at 11-115, §5:49 at 5-56.
53. David B. Torrey, The Common Law of Partial Disability and Vocational
Rehabilitation Under the Pennsylvania Workmens' Compensation Act: Kachinski and the
Availability of Work Doctrine, 33 Duq. L.Rev. 515, 521 (1992).
54. TORREY & GREENBERG, supra note 14, §5:2 at 5-11.
55. Id. §5:49 at 5-55.
56. Id. at 5-56.
57. Id. §5:25 at 5-42. A differential, also known as partial disability, is "sixty-six and
two thirds percent of the difference between the wages of the injured employee at the time
of his injury and the earning power of the employee thereafter." Id. §5:30 at 5-45.
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earning power, his compensation benefits will be suspended.5 It is
from this process that the case law has developed and the concepts
of partial disability and job availability have become firmly
enmeshed.
In the very early cases, the holdings required only that the
employer show some kind of improvement in the totally disabled
worker's medical condition to entitle the employer to change the
worker's benefits to partial disability.59 In Consona v. Coulborn &
Co., (Royal Indemnity Co.), the superior court addressed the issue
of whether an employer must show proof of job availability when a
claimant is capable of light duty work.6° The court held that it
would presume that light work was available if the employer
proved that a claimant could do light work. 6' However, under the
facts of the case, the court found that a steelworker who had
suffered a head injury and could only do light work at "irregular
intervals" was entitled to total disability in the absence of an offer
of suitable work from the employer.62 The court pointed out that,
"[iut is a matter of common knowledge that there is a general
disinclination on the part of employers to give work to cripples."6
Nevertheless, the court placed the burden squarely on the claimant
if he was capable of light work, as it was then automatically
presumed that light work was available.64
In Unora v. Glen Alden Coal Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court affirmed the doctrine of Consona, which agreed that the
availability of light duty work was presumed, but also added the
new caveat that the court should factor the claimant's vocational
background into the question.6 5 The employer still had no burden to
show the availability of a specific job if the court deemed the
employee only partially disabled. 6 However, the court directed that
factors, including the worker's. mental health, work background,
and education level, were to be weighed when determining whether
an injured worker was totally or partially disabled. 67 In the event
that it was shown that an injured worker could "handle only a
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. §5:25 at 5-42.
TORREY & GREENBERG, supra note 14, §5:50 at 5-57.
Consona v. Coulborn & Co., (Royal Indemnity Co.,) 158 A. 300 (Pa.Super. Ct. 1932).
Consona, 158 A. at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Unora v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 104 A.2d 104, 107 (Pa. 1954).
Unora, 104 A.2d at 107.
Id.
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specially-created job, one light of effort and responsibility but laden
with rest and comfort (employment plums that do not often dangle
from the tree of everyday economics), the burden is on the
defendant-employer to show that such a job is in fact within
reach."68 Even with the burden of this additional criteria, Torrey
pointed out that the employer's threshold was rather low as "the
requirements of Unora were usually deemed satisfied by the
physician's opinion that the claimant was, for example, capable
physically and vocationally of working at a job such as an elevator
operator."69
In 1967, the landmark case of Petrone v. Moffat Coal Company
radically changed the rule previously articulated in Consona and
Unora.70 In articulating the new law, the supreme court placed the
burden of proof on the employer to demonstrate work availability
for an otherwise partially disabled employee. 71 In Petrone, a coal
miner who developed anthracosilicosis was found capable of light
duty work as an elevator operator or power lawn mower, and thus
the court deemed him not totally disabled. 72 In overturning this
finding, Justice Musmanno found that the logic and rationale of the
prior practice, of presuming light duty work was available if the
claimant had some work capabilities, was not consonant with the
interpretation of the meaning of "disability" under the Act as
previously articulated in Unora.73 In Petrone, Musmanno announced
the revolutionary new rule that the employer must demonstrate
that actual modified work was available, in addition to a showing
74
that the injured worker was capable of a modified duty capacity.
His theory placed the burden on the employer because, "[i]f light
work is available, it is easier for defendant to prove its existence
than for claimant to prove its nonexistence." 75
Following quickly upon the heels of Petrone, in 1968, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Barrett v. Otis Elevator
Company, which confirmed that an employer had the burden to
68. Id.
69. TORREY & GREENBERG, supra note 14, §5:50 at 5-59.
70. Petrone v. Moffat Coal Co., 233 A.2d 891 (Pa. 1967).
71. Petrone, 233 A.2d at 894.
72. Id. at 892. Anthracosilicosis is, "a form of pneumoconiosis in which carbon and
silica deposits accumulate in the lungs due to breathing coal dust." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 110 (16th Ed. 1989).
73. Petrone, 233 A.2d at 893-94. Justice Musmanno pointed out that in Unora, the court
held that "the word disability is to be equated with loss of earning power." Id. at 893.
74. Id. at 894-95.
75. Id. at 895.
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prove job availability in all contexts, including claim petitions. 76 The
court relied on Petrone in holding that once an injured worker
demonstrated that he cannot perform his time-of-injury job, the
burden of proof then shifts to the employer to establish that
alternate work within his physical abilities is available to the
claimant. 77 The holding of Barrett established this as the rule,
regardless of whether the employer was seeking to modify the
injured worker's benefits or the injured worker was attempting to
obtain benefits via a claim petition.78
The first major case to deal with the question of partial disability
and job availability in a reinstatement petition context was Busche
v. WC.A.B. (Townsend and Bottum, Inc.). 79 In Busche, a plumber
underwent coronary bypass surgery after he sustained a
work-related heart attack and returned to work with his employer
in a specially-made, light duty position that paid him his pre-injury
wages, thereby suspending his compensation benefits.8 0 Eventually,
the employer eliminated the light duty position and offered the
injured worker full duty employment as a plumber.8' The court
relied on the language of Unora, regarding "specially made jobs,"
and the holdings in Petrone and Barrett to establish a new rule for
reinstatement proceedings.8 2 Under the new rule, if the injured
worker could show that but for his "specially created job" he
would have remained totally disabled, then the only burden of
proof he had in a reinstatement action was a showing that the
"specially created job" had been discontinued.83 By way of
clarification, the court stated, "under section 413 of the Act, 77 P.S.
§ 772, Claimant simply must show that, while his disability has
continued, his loss of earnings has recurred."8 4 As the employer
failed to offer other work within the claimant's restrictions,
claimant was entitled to reinstatement of total disability benefits.85
The commonwealth court had occasion in 1988 to again address
76. Barrett v. Otis Elevator Co., 246 A.2d 668 (Pa. 1968).
77. Barrett, 246 A.2d at 673-74.
78. Id.
79. Busche v. W.C.A.B. (Townsend and Bottum, Inc.), 466 .2d 278 (Pa.Commw. Ct.
1983).
80. Busche, 466 A.2d at 278-80. Claimant's sole occupation had always been as a
plumber, he was 58 years old, and had not performed actual plumbing work since his return
to modified duty work. Id. at 279.
81. Id. at 279.
82. Id. at 280.
83. Id. at 281.
84. Id.
85. Busche, 466 A.2d at 280.
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the issue of an employer's burden of proof for job availability in the
reinstatement context in the case of Fells v. W.C.A.B. (Caterpillar
Tractor).a6 Fells was remarkable in that it held that an employee
whose benefits were suspended when he returned to his pre-injury
job was entitled to reinstatement of total disability when laid off
due to economic reasons. 87 The court found that the claimant's
testimony and medical documentation confirmed that he had
continuing back problems, that it was "undisputed that Claimant
was laid off from his pre-injury job due to economic problems,"
and that the employer had not offered other employment to him.88
Invoking Busche, the court held that "when a claimant seeks to
have his or her suspension lifted, that claimant is required only to
demonstrate that the reasons for the suspension no longer exist."89
The employer's argument that the employee had returned to his
pre-injury job, and that this relieved it of having to show job
availability, was rejectedf 0 The court went on to say that there was
no "viable distinction" between a claimant who had returned to his
pre-injury job with a suspension of his benefits and a claimant who
had returned to a modified duty job with a similar suspension of
his benefits. 91 The rationale advanced by the court was that when a
claimant is under a suspension, for whatever reason, the employer
is effectively acknowledging that his disability continues. 92 Thus,
the court held that "a presumptive partial disability exists whenever
there is an agreement or an order to suspend compensation."93
In Pieper v. Ametek-Thermox Instruments Division, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court first reviewed the issue of the burden
of proof required for a claimant seeking reinstatement after a layoff
and articulated a new test in the process. 94 In Pieper, the claimant
sustained a low back injury and underwent surgery, but was
eventually able to resume full-time work with the employer.95
86. Fells v. W.C.A.B. (Caterpillar Tractor Co.), 552 A-2d 334, (PaCommnw. Ct. 1988).
87. Fells, 552 A.2d at 335-36. Claimant was a tow truck operator who sustained a low
back injury and received benefits, but was then able return to work at his pre-injury
position. Id.
88. Id. at 335.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 335-336.
92. Fells, 552 A.2d at 336. The court pointed out that the way the employer could avoid
acknowledging any ongoing disability was to prevail in a termination proceeding, which
would prove all disability had ceased. Id.
93. Id.
94. Pieper, 584 A2d at 301.
95. Id. at 302. Claimant did agree to a termination at one point, by signing a final
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However, just two days after resumption of full-time work, he was
laid off and consequently petitioned for reinstatement of his
benefits.96 The WCJ granted reinstatement of Pieper's benefits, and
97
the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board affirmed the order.
Ametek appealed to the commonwealth court, alleging that the
claimant failed to prove that his condition had deteriorated and had
not demonstrated a causal connection between his work injury and
his loss of earnings.9 8 The commonwealth court reversed.9
Justice Cappy, in resolving the issue, observed that the burden of
proof was different for a claimant seeking reinstatement after a
termination of benefits versus a claimant seeking reinstatement
after a suspension of benefits, and outlined the differences in
detail. 1°° He pointed out that a termination of benefits, by its very
nature, operates to relieve the employer of any ongoing liability for
the injury.1 1 If a claimant seeks reinstatement after a termination,
he will then bear the burden of proving a direct connection
between his previous work injury and his current condition in
order to be eligible for reinstatement of his benefits.' °2 In addition,
the claimant under a termination must also prove that his level of
disability has increased or recurred and his physical condition has
somehow worsened. °3
On the other hand, Justice Cappy noted that for the claimant in a
suspension scenario, the court presumes a causal connection
between the work injury and the ongoing disability. 1 4 This
connection is to be presumed for two reasons: (1) the employer
has either willingly accepted the original injury or the employee
05
has sufficiently established it by prevailing on a claim petition;
receipt, but the employer later reinstated his benefits when he suffered a recurrence. Id. He
then returned part-time and collected partial disability, and then upgraded to full-time, and
signed supplemental agreements for termination. Id.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 302-303.
Id. at 303.
Id.

99. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 303.
100. Id. at 303-04.
101. Id. at 304. Justice Cappy states "A termination of benefits is supported by a
finding that all disability related to the compensable injury has ceased." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 305. Justice Cappy indicated "[a] suspension of benefits is
supported by a finding that the earning power of the claimant is no longer affected by his
disability, whether it arises from his employer offering suitable replacement employment of
from the ability of the claimant to secure other suitable employment that provides equal or
greater compensation." Id. at 304.
105. Id.
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and (2) the employer's liability has not been relieved or terminated,
as there is no finding that the claimant has made a full recovery. 106
Without a full recovery, the disability persists, and so does the
07
liability of the employer.
After confirming that the claimant who is suspended enjoys the
automatic presumption of a causal connection, Justice Cappy then
ratified the rule of Busche, which states that the claimant need only
establish "that his disability has continued, and his loss of earnings
has recurred." 0 8 However, Justice Cappy also articulated a
two-prong test that the claimant must satisfy.1 9 Under the test, the
claimant must first demonstrate that he is suffering from a
decreased earning power because of his disability, through no fault
of his own.l ° The claimant must then satisfy the second prong of
the test, which mandates he show that the disability, which
resulted from his original work injury, has continued over time."'
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court first
determined that Pieper's benefits had only ever been on suspension
and the court then implemented the two-part test to Pieper's
case." 2 As to the first prong, it was not disputed that Pieper had
been laid off and he was deemed to have proven his earning power
was adversely affected." 3 With regard to the second prong, the
court found that the medical evidence did establish that Pieper's
disability had been of a continuing nature." 4 With both parts of the
test thus satisfied, the court held that Pieper was entitled to
reinstatement of his benefits "in the absence of any evidence that
5
other employment was available to him.""
The supreme court recently examined a slightly different nuance
106. Id. Justice Cappy points out that "[tihe only fact established at a suspension of
benefits is that the earning power of a claimant has improved to a point where benefits are
no longer necessary." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 306.
109. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 305. The two-prong test is needed because many month or
years may have gone by before a claimant finds that his economic position has changed and
he applies for reinstatement. Id.
110. Id. at 305.
111. Id. This is not the same as re-proving causal connection, but "because of the
passage of time, the law does require that he prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
it is the same disability that the law presumes occurred during his original employment and
for which he initially received workmen's compensation benefits." Id.
112. Id. at 306. The court found that "the record evidence fails to establish a
'termination' of the liability of Ametek." Id.
113. Id. at 308.
114. Pieper, 584 A.2d at 308.
115. Id.
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of the reinstatement scenario in Stevens v. WC.A.B (Consolidation
Coal). In Stevens, the claimant had never achieved a full recovery
from the work injury and was terminated from his job with 1a6
different employer "based on unsatisfactory job performance."'
The employer argued that the claimant was not entitled to
reinstatement in this situation since he failed to carry the burden of
117
proof that he sustained a loss of earnings due to his work injury.
The employer argued that because Stevens had been fired, he did
not meet the criteria of Pieper, which holds that the renewed loss
of earnings must be "through no fault of his own."" 8 Justice
Zappala rejected this argument and held that in the two-prong test
of Pieper, "the fault concept was tied to the availability of work."" 9
In fact, Justice Zappala specifically found that Stevens did satisfy
the Pieper test since he had made a good-faith effort to perform
the new job and his disability from the original work injury was
120
ongoing and prevented him from returning to his pre-injury job.
As Stevens passed the test of Pieper, it was then incumbent upon
the employer to show evidence of available employment, and
lacking such evidence, "the reinstatement of benefits was proper." 2 '
In Bethlehem Steel, Justice Zappala has once again ratified the
rule enunciated in Pieper and confirmed its status as the current
law with respect to a claimant's burden of proof when seeking
reinstatement after being laid off from a modified duty position.
The case affirms that Pennsylvania case law has appropriately
intertwined the concepts of partial disability and the doctrine of
job availability, and confirmed that those concepts are so
interdependent that a court cannot separate them when looking at
the question of what should happen when an employee working
modified duty is subsequently laid off.
The progressive elevation of the employer's burden to show that
light duty work is available when it attempts to modify or suspend
an injured worker's benefits has been slow but steady. In the
earliest days of Consona, when all that the employer had to show
was that the worker had made some minimal improvement in his
medical condition, it was inequitable to assume that light duty
116. Stevens v. WC.A.B. (Consolidation Coal), 760 A2d 369, 372-73 (Pa. 2000).
117. Stevens, 760 A2d at 372-73.
118. Id. at 374. Their rationale was that in this instance, the loss of earnings was not
attributable to his work injury. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 371.
121. Id. at 377.
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work was realistically there for the taking.122 Even the caveat of
Unora, which required the factoring of an injured employee's
vocational background into the assessment of whether light duty
work was truly, available, did not alleviate the glaring slant of the
law running in favor of the employer to the general detriment of
the injured worker.'2 In the late 1960's, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court took an appropriate step toward leveling the playing field. In
Petrone, the court began to shift the balance by discarding the
assumption that light duty work was available and making the
24
employer prove that it actually existed.
This decisional law eventually benefited injured employees who,
although not fully recovered, returned to work in light duty
positions and had their benefits suspended, only to find themselves
having to litigate to obtain benefits if the employer later laid them
off. The holdings of Busche and Fells turned the tables 180 degrees
and established that the employee who returns to modified duty
work is entitled to the presumption that his disability continued,
even if his loss of earnings did not. 25 This concept is entirely in
keeping with the reality that faces an injured worker who is doing
light duty work with no loss of earnings, but has not yet achieved a
full duty release. The current caselaw places the employee in a
more tenable position and lightens his burden of proof for
reinstatement in the event his employer chooses to stop making the
light duty work available and lay him off prior to his full recovery
from the work injury.
The decision in Pieper clearly and rationally explained why the
burden of proof differs for the worker who is terminated versus the
worker whose benefits were suspended when he returned to
modified duty. 26 The two-prong test, which Justice Cappy
articulated in Pieper, has sharpened and clarified the burdens on
both sides of the fence. 127 By maintaining the presumption that a
worker in modified duty has some ongoing level of disability, the
court has made it easier for that worker to get reinstatement of
benefits after a layoff, by requiring him only to demonstrate his
loss of earnings has recurred through no fault of his own.1' On the
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Consona, 158 A. at 300.
Unora, 105 A.2d at 104.
Petrone,233 A.2d at 891.
Busche, 466 A.2d at 278; Fells, 552 A.2d at 334.
Pieper,584 A.2d at 301.
Id.
Id.
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flipside, the employer still has an opportunity to cut its losses by
offering other modified duty work to the injured employee, and can
avoid reinstating benefits if they establish the light duty job
availability.129 This is eminently fair since the employer still has the
ability to control their workers' compensation costs by providing
other work within an injured worker's capabilities, and yet it
discourages employers from engineering abusive or retaliatory
layoffs of people who are working light duty.
The ratification of the rule of Pieper in the Bethlehem Steel
decision is entirely in consonance with safeguarding and providing
benefits for injured employees, while still affording employers an
opportunity to mitigate their workers' compensation losses.' 30
Bethlehem Steel confirms a logical evolution of the law that fairly
weighs the considerations and needs of both employees and
employers. Furthermore, it provides workable guidelines and lucid
criteria for the Workers' Compensation Judge who is charged with
resolving the question of what happens to an injured employee on
light duty in the aftermath of a company layoff.
Anita A. Reno

129. Id.
130. Bethlehem Steel, 760 A.2d 378 (Pa. 2000).

